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Abstract
John Locke is known within anthropology primarily for his empiricism, his views of
natural laws, and his discussion of the state of nature and the social contract. Marilyn
Strathern and Marshall Sahlins, however, have offered distinctive, novel, and broad
reflections on the nature of anthropological knowledge that appeal explicitly to a
lesser-known aspect of Locke’s work: his metaphysical views of relations. This paper
examines their distinctive conclusions – Sahlins’ about cultural relativism, Strathern’s
about relatives and kinship – both of which concern the objectivity of anthropological
knowledge. Although Locke’s own views of relations have been neglected by historians
of philosophy in the past, recent and ongoing philosophical discussions of Locke on
relations create a productive trading zone between philosophy and anthropology on
the objectivity of anthropological knowledge that goes beyond engagement with the
particular claims made by Sahlins and Strathern.
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I Introduction
John Locke is central to Western thought for his views of the nature and limits of
human knowledge, and of human social and political structures, and his work
remains of continuing, general interest for historians of philosophy working in
metaphysics, epistemology, and political philosophy (see Stuart, 2013, 2016).
Locke’s inﬂuence in anthropology, however, primarily exists as a legacy of
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particular views that Locke held of human knowledge and the nature of society: his
empiricism, his belief in natural laws and their relation to human progress, and his
discussion of that strangely asocial condition of human existence, the state of
nature, and the social contract that putatively moves individuals from that state
to one of civilization. For the most part, anthropologists have regarded such views
as manifesting the kind of Enlightenment perspective on human nature that
20th-century cultural anthropology fought to overturn, and that 21st-century
anthropology has moved beyond.
Two prominent contemporary anthropologists, Marshall Sahlins and Marilyn
Strathern, however, have appealed to Locke’s metaphysics in An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding1 – particularly Locke’s seldom-discussed views of relations –
in articulating and defending broader, distinctive views of anthropological know-
ledge: about cultural relativism (for Sahlins) and about relatives and kinship
(for Strathern). These appropriations of Locke, tangential side dishes as they are
to the larger ﬁsh that Sahlins and Strathern wish to fry, provide the basis for a
productive trading zone between philosophy and anthropology, particularly given
the renewed, recent attention directed by philosophers at Locke’s views of relations
(Heil, 2012; Ott, in press; Stuart, 2013). Or so I would like to suggest. More
particularly, by attending more closely to some of the complexities within
Locke’s text, as well as those raised by it, we can not only instructively engage
with the claims that both Sahlins and Strathern make about relations, but also
more constructively open a dialogue relevant to both disciplines about the object-
ivity of anthropological knowledge and the corresponding metaphysics of relations.
In ‘Goodbye to Triste Tropes: Ethnography in the Context of Modern World
History’ (1993), Sahlins draws on Locke in order to make a point about our know-
ledge of relations, especially of historical relations, in ethnography. Such ethno-
graphic knowledge, claims Sahlins, avoids a postmodern impasse in the study of
culture, and so also the cultural relativism that leads to, or is sometimes a conse-
quence of, that impasse. For Sahlins, Locke’s Essay contains an insight about the
objectivity of at least a certain kind of relational knowledge, an insight forgotten or
ignored by contemporary anthropologists who view cultural relativism both as
marking limits to anthropological knowledge and as revealing something about
its character.
In Kinship, Law, and the Unexpected: Relatives Are Always a Surprise (2005),
Strathern takes what Locke says about relations in just the opposite direction in her
exploration of a series of crossovers, what she refers to as the repeated echo,
between knowledge practices and kinship practices, introducing a view that informs
and is developed in her more recent and ongoing work on relations (Strathern
2014a, 2014b). For Strathern, the insight to be found in Locke’s views of relations
calls into question the objectivity of anthropological knowledge, particularly know-
ledge about kinship. Strathern appeals to Locke to provide a twist to her continu-
ing, post-biological reimagining of kinship, taking Locke’s discussion of relations
to signal a potentially interesting genealogical story about ‘relations’ that reveals
something important about the 17th-century pre-history of kinship studies: that
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relations qua kinship are, in a certain sense, derivatives of relations qua knowledge.
Recognition of this, in turn, reinforces the prevailing contemporary anthropo-
logical perspective on kinship as a ﬂuid, contingent construction originating in
peculiarly Western preoccupations, a perspective that Sahlins (2011a, 2011b,
2013a) has also more recently come to at least partially share. On this view –
that of what is often referred to as the new kinship studies – kinship does not
have the objectivity that it was assumed to have within the classic study of kinship.
In particular, kinship lacks a basis in the genealogical, biological, or reproductive
relations that were once thought to ground the objectivity of the study of kinship.2
Given their distinctive concerns and orientations, Sahlins’ and Strathern’s
arrival at contrasting, even opposed, conclusions about the objectivity of anthropo-
logical knowledge from reﬂection on the same parts of Locke’s text should occa-
sion little surprise. Indeed, resolution of whatever dissonance there is here is not
one of the aims of the present paper.3 I begin with some philosophical scene-setting,
ﬁrst brieﬂy characterizing the context in which Locke was writing (Section II) in
order to consider what Locke himself says that has caught the attention of Sahlins
and Strathern (Section III).
II Pre-Lockean philosophical work on relations
Like muchWestern philosophy in the 17th century, Locke’s metaphysics was shaped
by the Aristotelian views that structured preceding discussions within core parts of
medieval philosophy. In that context, the world was viewed as containing independ-
ently existing, particular things or substances, each with its own distinctive, depend-
ent set of properties (or modes or accidents). A particular entity, such as a tiger or a
chair, is a substance, and the properties it has determine its mode of existence: the
particular way in which it exists, e.g. being striped, or having four legs.
Perhaps the most important asymmetry between substances and modes concerns
their independence, reﬂected in the observation that a given thing could still be the
thing it is even without some or perhaps even each of the properties it happens to
have. Yet modes lack this kind of independence: without a substance to inhere
in, the property of (say) having stripes or four legs – of being sharp-toothed or
four-legged – is merely some kind of abstraction.
Staying true to the description of this as a short primer on the context in which
Locke wrote, I want to move directly to introduce relations into the picture, rather
than pursue a more elaborate, philosophical characterization of this context. Apart
from substances and modes, ‘relations’ was the other Aristotelian ontological
category taken up within medieval philosophy and, in light of that, by Locke
himself. Just as a tiger and a chair can each have certain modes, so too can they
also stand in various relations to one another: for example, they might be physically
next to each other, or the tiger might be sitting on the chair. Relations could be
spatial and physical, as in these examples, biological (as we will see in Locke),
historical (as we will shortly see in Sahlins), or even mental, as in the case of
thinking about something.
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A natural position would be to view relations very much like modes vis-a`-vis
particular substances. Just as a tiger can have the intrinsic property of having fur, so
too can it stand in the relation of sitting on a chair. This suggests that relational
knowledge should be taken at face value: it is knowledge of the relations that
actually exist between two or more substances, and those relations are expressed,
‘directly’ as philosophers might say, by the corresponding relational predicates.
Anthropology is replete with such relational knowledge. That Niska is the
mother of Sasha, that she has received gifts from the family of Dala, or that she
belongs to a matrilineal society, are all relational facts about Niska: they tell us
about Niska’s relational properties, what relations she participates in. These hold
in virtue of the historical, social, and cultural relations holding between her and
other individuals and larger-scale social entities.
On this face value view of relations, relations are part of what make up such
facts, much as being ﬁve feet tall is part of what makes it true that Niska is ﬁve feet
tall. Relational knowledge is just knowledge of such facts and of the relations that
constitute them. This view of relations and relational knowledge draws on what I’ll
call a preservationist intuition: that many statements involving an appeal to rela-
tions are true, and this requires the existence of the corresponding relations. Thus,
relations should be preserved within one’s metaphysics.
Yet despite its almost tautologous feel, the face value view of relations clearly is
not Locke’s own view; it has also proven to be very much a minority view amongst
philosophers, who tend to be metaphysical Scrooges, as I shall try to explain in what
follows (cf. Heil, 2012; Stuart, 2013). Before turning to consider in more detail how
Sahlins and Strathern draw on Locke’s views here, we need a better sense of the fuller
textual context in which Locke developed his views of relations, and of what alter-
natives to the face value view of relations philosophers have defended, and why.
III Locke on relations
Although Locke mentions relations and relational knowledge in passing in many
places in his Essay, his most concentrated discussion occurs in Chapter XXV of
Book II, ‘Of Relations’. Here Locke sets himself two goals. The ﬁrst goal is to
provide a general characterization of the nature of relations, together with recog-
nized consequences of that characterization (II.xxv). The second goal is to show
how relations, so characterized, could be accommodated by Locke’s empiricist
view of ideas. Locke attempts to show this in the subsequent chapters on the
relation of cause and eﬀect (II.xxvi), on identity and diversity (II.xxvii, added
only in the second edition), and on moral relations (II.xxviii). The nature of rela-
tion, says Locke,
consists in the referring, or comparing two things, one to another; from which com-
parison, one or both comes to be denominated. And if either of those things be
removed, or cease to be, the Relation ceases, and the Denomination consequent to
it, though the other receive in it self no alteration at all. (II.xxv.5, 1975: 321)
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Locke seems to be saying that what relations hold between any two things are
simply a matter of what comparisons we can draw between those things. This
would make ‘relations’ depend very much on our powers of comparison, a view
of relations as mental constructs that is continuous with that dominant in later
medieval philosophy.
This is a subjectivist (nominalist, idealist, constructivist, anti-realist)4 view of
relations, according to which relations are very much in the eye of the beholder.
Rather than relations being part of the fabric of the universe in the way in which
substances and modes are, as the face value view claims, for a subjectivist relational
knowledge is some kind of function of our own mental activity. Just as the face
value view of relations is motivated by a preservationist intuition, subjectivism is
motivated by a competing eliminativist intuition about relations: whatever relations
are, they should not be taken to be, like intrinsic properties, part of a mind-
independent reality.
Whether a subjectivist reading of Locke can be sustained is clouded by Locke’s
self-conscious and notorious tendency to shift, here as elsewhere in the Essay,
between talk of qualities and talk of ideas (Bennett, 1996; Stuart, 2013: 2). It is
also called into question by other things that Locke says about relations, including
in the second sentence in the above passage (‘if either of those things . . .’), where
Locke treats relations (or at least some relations) as mind-independent connections
between things in the world.
Locke continues this passage by illustrating his general point – that relations can
change without a change in the subject of the relation – by appealing, as Strathern
notes in several places (2005: 66, 2014a: 6), to the father-son relation, considering
‘Cajus, whom I consider today as a Father, ceases to be so tomorrow, only by the
death of his Son, without any alteration made in himself’ (II.xxv.5). Locke makes
this same appeal to kinship relations in illustrating all three substantive points he
goes on to make about ‘Relation in general’: (1) that things ‘are capable of as many
Relations, as there can be occasions of comparing’ (II.xxv.7, 1975: 322); (2) that
our ideas of relations ‘are often clearer, and more distinct, than of those Substances
to which they do belong’ (II.xxv.8, 1975: 322); and (3) that relative terms ‘are
Words, which, together with the thing they denominate, imply also something
else separate and exterior to the existence of that thing’ (II.xxv.10, 1975: 323).
That these illustrative appeals to kinship relations are common in Locke, and
occur alongside similar appeals to relations based on companionship (friend),
nationality (English-man), social station (Patron), and explicit comparatives
(superior, bigger, old) suggest kinship as a domain suﬃciently familiar to
Locke’s readers for him to be able to readily rely on that familiarity, a point to
which I shall return in discussing Strathern.
Locke also uses a parent-oﬀspring example featuring ‘two Cassiowaries in St.
James’s Park’ to illustrate the second of the three points above: that one could
‘have a clear Idea of the Relation of Dam and Chick’ while only having ‘a very
obscure and imperfect Idea of those Birds themselves’ (II.xxv.10, 1975: 323). All
one needs to have such a clear idea, claims Locke, is the notion ‘that one laid the
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Egg, out of which the other was hatched’. Since such notions are easily acquired,
knowledge of the nature of a relation can proceed in the absence of anything like
knowledge of the nature of the corresponding relata. Given Locke’s scepticism
about our knowledge of the nature of substance in general and of particular
substances (II.xxiii), the aspect of relational knowledge to which he is drawing
attention here likely serves as a kind of inoculation against the complete spread
of scepticism into knowledge in general.
Most relevant for our immediate purposes is what Locke goes on in II.xxviii to
make of this very relation between dam and chick, for it exempliﬁes what Locke
calls natural relations. These are relations based on a thing’s origin or beginning.
Here Locke claims that ‘‘tis certain, that in reality, the Relation is the same, betwixt
the Begetter, and the Begotten, in the several Races of other Animals, as well as
Men’ (II.xxviii.2, 1975: 349). The kin relations had by ‘one Community of Blood’,
claims Locke, are also to be found in these races of other animals, even though we
do not use kinship terms, such as ‘grandfather’, to describe these relations. This,
thinks Locke, shows ‘that Mankind have ﬁtted their Notions and Words to the use
of common Life, and not to the truth and extent of Things’ (p. 349). This reminds
us of two things of import about Locke’s own views of knowledge and kinship.
The ﬁrst is that Locke takes it for granted not only that human kin relations are
grounded in biological relations, such as begetting and sharing blood, but that such
relations exist in the animal world as well. Such ideas have been a central target of
the Schneiderian critique of kinship within anthropology to which, in their diﬀerent
ways, Sahlins and Strathern are sympathetic. They have been such a target in part
for the ways in which they have led to ethnocentric explorations of kinship, some-
thing I will take up in the concluding sections of the paper (see also Wilson, in
press a).
The second is that although Locke says that relation ‘consists in the referring or
comparing two things, one to another’ (II.xxv.5, 1975: 321), suggesting the subject-
ivist view that relations simply are, in his terms, creatures of the understanding, it is
clear here that Locke accepts the distinction between relations as they really are in
the world, and relations as they function in our ideas of, and words for, ‘the truth
and extent of Things’. Or at least Locke does so for some relations, such as natural
relations, including (according to him) kinship relations.
This second point brings us directly to Sahlins on Locke. For the role of rela-
tional knowledge in making objective claims is central to how Sahlins uses Locke in
his case for historical ethnography as a way to reach beyond the relativist impasse
that he ﬁnds in the work of some of his postmodern colleagues.
IV Sahlins on Locke on relations
Sahlins’ long-standing championing of historical ethnography is well known
within anthropology (Sahlins, 1985, 2004), as is his more general advocacy of
dialogue between historians and anthropologists and his cynicism about various
afterologies, those postmodern spectres haunting the humanities and social sciences
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(Sahlins, 2002). Sahlins’ ‘Goodbye to Triste Tropes’ blends this championing,
advocacy and cynicism, anchoring his more general themes in discussions of
aspects of Hawaiian and Fijian history and cultures about which he is an authority.
Having begun by pointing to historical ethnography as oﬀering an alternative to
the ‘celebration of the impossibility of systematically understanding the elusive
Other’ that forms part of a postmodern sensibility in ethnography, Sahlins con-
cludes by drawing on ‘a genial argument of the Essay Concerning Human
Understanding’. What is this argument of Locke’s that Sahlins ﬁnds so genial for
his purposes? As one might expect, Sahlins is his own best spokesperson:
Locke says that we necessarily know things relationally, by their ‘dependence’ on
other things (IV.6.11). However absolutely and entire the objects of perception may
seem to us, they ‘are but Retainers to other parts of Nature’. . . .The observation
has capital applications in anthropology – granted that philosophers have never
been too happy with these ‘secondary qualities, mediately perceived’. Locke drew
the fundamental implication that it is impossible to exhaust the empirical description
of any object, since its properties can be known only through interaction with an
indeﬁnite number of other objects. It follows that the objectivity of objects is humanly
construed, that is, by an historically relative selection and symbolic valuation of only
some of the possible concrete referents. Essentialized descriptions are not the platonic
fantasies of anthropologists alone; they are general cultural conditions of human
perception and communication.
More directly pertinent here is that Locke is also saying that we know the attributes of
things historically. We know things from the changes they make in, or receive from,
other things. . . . So it is with cultural orders. They reveal their properties by the way
they respond to diverse circumstances, organizing those circumstances in speciﬁc
forms, and in the event, changing their forms in speciﬁc ways. (1993: 498–9)
Sahlins then points to historical ethnography as a way of ‘allowing a principled
description of cultural orders as systems of diﬀerence’ (1993: 499); it provides a
method for moving beyond the ethnographical paralysis brought on by an excess of
afterological enthusiasm in anthropology.
While Sahlins no doubt does not take himself to be engaged in Locke scholar-
ship here, he has identiﬁed something of topical resonance in Locke that is inter-
esting in its own right. Sahlins’ basic point is that we can (or should) view Locke as
identifying an epistemic role for history in human understanding in general, and
that we can take this general insight as applicable to cultural orders in particular.
Since our descriptions and constructions of objects always depend on the relations,
especially historical relations, they bear to other objects, such knowledge of
relations plays a crucial role in what we know in general. Cultural orders are
no exception. But such relational knowledge plays a second, crucial role in ethnog-
raphy in particular, for cultural orders themselves change as a result of the relations
they have with one another, changes that are most accurately understood from the
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perspective that history provides. This marks the end of ‘an ethnography that was
the archaeology of the living, searching under the disturbed topsoil of modernity
for the traces of a pristine and ‘‘primitive’’ existence’ (1993: 499).
One point that Sahlins thus extracts from Locke is that relational knowledge,
especially knowledge of historical relations, is an instrument for justifying
claims about the nature of cultural orders, as it is for understanding objects
more generally. Ethnography without history may not suﬀer completely from
Kantian blindness nor emptiness, but knowledge of the relevant cultural history
provides one way of sorting more from less adequate ethnographic analyses, and
more generally in advancing ethnographic understanding. If historical knowledge
has this role in the study of cultures, then it is a tool for undermining both malaise
about the possibility of resolving disputes within ethnography, and the kind of
cultural relativism that accompanies it. For Locke, our knowledge of relations
provides a basis for gaining what Locke would call ‘real knowledge’ (IV.iv.3):
knowledge of things as they really are, despite whatever limitations human know-
ledge faces. For Sahlins, relational knowledge, in the guise of history, allows us to
at least approximate such knowledge in the study of cultural orders, a kind of
objectivity within that study that one might otherwise overlook.
V Cultural knowledge and the nature of relations
To see the import of Sahlins’ adapted, take-home message from Locke – that
‘we know the attributes of things historically’ – we begin by exploring in more
detail what Locke himself means in saying that we know the attributes of things
relationally. For Locke, the relational probing of objects – in this circumstance,
through that observed interaction – is a principal way of ﬁnding out about the
properties that things have. Knowledge of relations is instrumental knowledge,
perhaps indispensable knowledge. In part this is due to the point that for Locke
our ideas of relations ‘are often clearer, and more distinct, than of those Substances
to which they do belong’ (II.xxv.8, 1975: 322). Additionally, Locke holds that what
is often taken to be knowledge of things themselves is really knowledge of the
relations they stand in (e.g. Cajus as a father).
The face value and subjectivist views of relations introduced in Sections II and
III provide two contrasting ways to interpret Locke’s views of such instrumental
knowledge. Subjectivism about Locke’s view of relations takes Locke at his word
when he says that relation ‘consists in the referring, or comparing two things, one
to another; from which comparison, one or both comes to be denominated’
(II.xxv.5, 1975: 321) and that things ‘are capable of as many Relations, as there
can be occasions of comparing’ (II.xxv.7, 1975: 322). Whether the subjectivist
view can be accepted as a general view of relations (i.e. of all relations) is doubtful,
since there are at least some relations – consider our previous examples of simple
physical relations, such as being physically next to or sitting on – that do not seem
to depend on our powers of comparison in the way that subjectivism requires. To
put it bluntly, whether Niska is physically next to Sasha, or whether Sasha is sitting
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on Niska, does not depend in any substantive way on our subjectivity. But sub-
jectivism is also puzzling more speciﬁcally in the context of defending a role for
relational knowledge, including relational knowledge in anthropology.5
The puzzle is just how relations, as construed within subjectivism, could play an
instrumental role in the generation of knowledge, particularly in the way that
historical relations do on Sahlins’ view. If relations themselves are some kind of
function of our understanding, as opposed to a part of the mind-independent uni-
verse, then knowledge of relations is knowledge of something projected by us onto
the world. How something with this kind of ontological status could be a suitable
basis for increasing the objectivity of cultural knowledge remains to be explained.
Since returning to employ the philosophical language of a mind-independent
universe here may raise anthropological eyebrows, let me clarify what is meant and
what is not meant. The social and cultural relations that are the staple of anthro-
pology (and the social sciences more generally) are relations that hold between, and
that depend upon, creatures like us with minds. To return again to earlier exam-
ples, the historical, social, and cultural relations that hold between Niska and other
individuals and larger-scale social entities in virtue of which Niska is the mother of
Sasha, or has received gifts from the family of Dala, or belongs to a matrilineal
society, are all mind-dependent in this sense. Perhaps the philosopher John Searle
(1995, 2010) is correct in thinking that social institutions and even sociality itself is
mind-dependent in this same sense (though see Wilson in press b, in press c,
for some doubts). But this kind of dependence between social relations and
minds does not itself support a subjectivist view of those relations, making them
mind-independent in a way that would impugn their objectivity. Whether Niska is
the mother of Sasha is no more determined simply by one’s subjective states than is
whether Niska is physically next to Sasha, even though the ﬁrst invokes a social,
the second a physical, relation.
In any case, we do not need to further explore the intricacies of the puzzle of just
how a subjectivist view of social and cultural relations could account for their
instrumentality in knowledge generation, or the generality of the subjectivist
view of relations, to see what should be unattractive about that view for those
interested in Sahlins’ appropriation of Locke. Sahlins’ broader point is that histor-
ical knowledge provides one way for ethnography to move beyond relativism about
our knowledge of cultural orders. The subjectivist view of relations implies that
historical relations, like relations more general, are mind-dependent in a way that
calls into question their objectivity, and so historical knowledge becomes simply
one more layer of social construction. Given that, historical ethnographies would
be unable to move us beyond relativism. Put diﬀerently, if there is nothing more to
historical ethnography than particular subjective takes on the past articulated
through appeals to ‘historical relations’, as subjectivism about relations would
imply, then historical ethnography cannot arbitrate between those with diﬀerent
views of the ethnographic present.
So independent of the general defensibility of the subjectivist view of relations,
or of subjectivism as a reading of Locke, this is not a plausible option for those who
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share Sahlins’ aims. This suggests that the face value view of relations is at least a
more plausible starting point for making a case for the objectivity of relational
knowledge. But we can quickly see why it is little more than a starting point, and
why philosophers have found attractive the eliminativist intuition pulling them to
subjectivism, by considering a third view of relational knowledge, what I will call
the explanationist view of relations. Explanationism about relations, I will also
suggest, proves useful in advancing discussion of both cultural relativism and kin-
ship, the anthropological concerns that brought Sahlins and Strathern, respect-
ively, to Locke on relations in the ﬁrst place.
VI Explanationism about relations
The explanationist view takes knowledge of relations to be objective (speaking to
the preservationist intuition) but allows that objectivity to consist in knowledge of
non-relational facts (speaking to the eliminativist intuition). Consider a simple,
physical relation. If Niska is shorter than Dala, then this fact holds not simply
in virtue of there being the relation is shorter than between Niska and Dala; rather,
what makes this true is simply that Niska has a certain height, and Dala has a
certain height. Likewise, if Niska is the mother of Sasha, this relation may be
understood in terms of other facts about Niska, Sasha, and the culture they live
in. If so, then we can take relational knowledge to be objective without having to
accept an ontology laden with the corresponding relations, as the face value
assumes.
So in contrast to the face value view of relations, explanationism probes beneath
the surface of our appeals to relations. Relational knowledge is real, but it is really
(at least often enough) knowledge of something other than the relations speciﬁed in
the corresponding knowledge claims. In the case of the relational claim ‘Niska is
shorter than Dala’, what makes this claim true is a fact about Niska’s height and a
fact about Dala’s height: there is no need to ascribe anything more than intrinsic
properties to Niska and Dala. Niska’s being shorter than Dala is fully explained by
these two intrinsic properties, one holding for Niska, the other for Dala. And what
is true in this case is true more generally of the relation is shorter than. Thus, that
relation can be reductively explained fully in terms of substances and modes. In this
sense, this comparative relation is not ontologically fundamental; rather it should
be understood non-relationally.
One version of explanationism, one likely tempting to someone with Locke’s
own views, that generalizes this insight about at least some relations makes an
appeal to relations to provide instrumental knowledge of the intrinsic properties
that things in themselves possess, and relations in general to be reducible and thus
eliminable. On this view, relational knowledge about some thing is a tool for
ﬁnding out about the intrinsic nature of that thing, its essence, just as we might
use our knowledge of the observable properties of an object to discover its unob-
servable properties. For example, we observe the litmus paper turn red, and we
infer that the liquid into which it was dipped is an acid, and know something about
10 Anthropological Theory 0(0)
 by guest on August 16, 2016ant.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
the intrinsic nature of that liquid – in this case, about its chemical structure. Such
contingent and defeasible knowledge about the liquid is knowledge not simply of
its relations and relational properties, but of its intrinsic nature.
Locke is as good a starting point as any to appreciate the welcoming reception
that this view has had within philosophy. Consider ﬁrst the kinds of object that
Locke himself had in mind in thinking about our knowledge of relations. These are
the paradigmatic physical objects that exercised 17th-century philosophers more
generally – lumps of wax, snowballs, and almonds (to take three examples from
Locke’s Essay, II.viii) – everyday, physical objects that appear to possess properties
such as determinate sizes, shapes, colors, temperatures, and tastes. On this reduc-
tionist version of explanationism, we use relational knowledge to ﬁgure out which
of these putative properties objects really possess, which of them are intrinsic to
those objects, or that form a part of their nature. To take a trivial example, we
might make use of the odor that a substance gives oﬀ, or how it reacts with other
chemical substances, to identify it as ammonia and to begin to ﬁgure out what its
intrinsic structure is, and how that structure generates observable properties. Here
our knowledge of ammonia’s odor, or of its reactivity, serves primarily as an
instrument for gaining knowledge of the underlying essence of ammonia. These
relational facts about ammonia – that it has a certain smell (to us), that it under-
goes certain reactions (when heated or mixed in certain ways) – are not what
relational knowledge aims to uncover, but the means to attaining that goal.
Such a view implies an asymmetry between intrinsic properties, on the one hand,
and relational properties and relations, on the other, one manifest in Locke’s own
endorsement of corpuscularianism and in the distinction, commonly invoked since
Locke, between primary and secondary qualities.6 This asymmetry runs deep in
both the history of philosophy and in contemporary philosophy, and the positive
conception of knowledge and objectivity that it feeds gives reason to move beyond
the naivety of the face value view of relations. On this view, knowledge begins with
simple objects and their intrinsic properties, and then expands to more complex
objects and their intrinsic properties, with relational properties being primarily
of instrumental epistemic value and of secondary metaphysical standing. The epis-
temic strategies of decomposition and integration that such a view recommends are
ubiquitous across the physical, biological, and cognitive sciences, even if they
produce the distortion that I have elsewhere (Wilson 2004: 22–4, 2005: 38–41)
mockingly labeled smallism, discrimination in favor of the small, and so against
the not-so-small, in those sciences.
There are general disciplinary peculiarities – the sceptical paranoia that appear-
ance might depart radically from reality, the focus on physical objects as paradigm
objects of knowledge, the search for a general account of all relational knowledge
that locates it in one place in an overarching taxonomy of knowledge – that give this
particular reductionist form of explanationism an appeal for philosophers that it no
doubt lacks for anthropologists. Yet theorizing about culture and society has not
entirely escaped the clutches of smallist thinking: the methodological tendencies in
play here recur in anthropology and in theorizing about the social world more
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generally, whether in the reduction of social and cultural relations to non-social and
non-cultural relations (e.g. psychologism, methodological individualism), in the
search for what are, in eﬀect, social corpuscles (e.g., rational individuals, primitive
society), or in attempts to identify social institutions or domains that are founda-
tional for culture (e.g. the family, reciprocity).
What is absent in anthropology, however, is a radical version of explanationism
that views relations as purely instrumental for the production of knowledge of
intrinsic natures. For in cultural and social orders, relations are themselves the
objects of study.7 Here the preservationist intuition about relations makes at
least the reductive version of explanationism unattractive. In addition, this version
of explanationism seems an unlikely path for Sahlins himself to pursue, if only
because the kind of smallism it embeds is just the sort of view that Sahlins has
critiqued in much of his other work (e.g., Sahlins, 1976, 2008). It is also diﬃcult to
see Strathern having much traﬃc with such a version of explanationism, given her
focus on understanding relations on their own terms, and in terms of the relations
between relations.
Perhaps at this point we need to surface for air. Thus far we have considered
three views of the metaphysics of relations – the face value view, subjectivism, and
explanationism. If I am right about the ill-suitedness of both the subjectivist and
(reductive) explanationist views of relations for Sahlinsesque purposes, and about
the face value view of relations being at best a starting point rather than a defens-
ible, all-things-considered view, then non-reductive forms of explanationism are the
best option for someone like Sahlins aiming to incorporate relational knowledge
into a non-relativist account of ethnographical knowledge. Non-reductive expla-
nationism would also seem apt for someone like Strathern whose interest is very
much explanationist in understanding relations amongst various relations
(metarelations, if you like).
To develop and defend this idea, we need a better sense of the details of Strathern’s
metarelational reﬂections and their relationship to Locke. Doing so will allow us
to transition to a discussion of a particular form of cultural knowledge – that of
kinship – with which both Strathern and Sahlins have grappled in their recent work.
VII Strathern’s transposition thesis about relations
One general theme in Strathern’s Kinship, Law, and the Unexpected is the entwine-
ment of epistemic relations, such as knowing and conceptualizing, and interpersonal
relations, such as kinship and reproduction, a theme resonating in her continuing
work on relations (e.g. Strathern, 2014a, 2014b). In her introductory overview to the
book, Strathern explains the origins of her work here, and the place of Locke in what
she has to say. Referring to the discussion of Locke that we have already taken up in
Sahlins, Strathern says of Chapter 3, ‘Emergent Properties’, in particular that
[I]ts impetus goes back to a ‘discovery’: the verbal crossovers that the English lan-
guage allows between conceptual and interpersonal relations. It was the inter-twining
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that started me oﬀ in the 1990s (Strathern, 1995). Although I was not aware at the
time, Sahlins (1993: 24–25) had drawn attention to Locke’s dictum that we necessarily
know things ‘relationally’ by their dependence on other things; a brief foray into how
Locke made the concept concrete is at the centre of this chapter. (2005: 12)
In her earlier work referred to above, Strathern had expressed her intrigue with ‘the
consistent parallel, the repeated echo, between intellectual propagation and pro-
creative acts, between knowledge and kinship’ (1995: 8). As we have seen, in order
to make a point about epistemic relations, Locke appealed to the biological kinship
relation that holds between the dam and chick of the exotic cassowary. Strathern
takes Locke’s point to be ‘to illustrate the logical circumstance whereby a relation
could be perceived clearly even though the precise nature of the entities themselves
might be in doubt’ (2005: 66). For Locke, she claims, the ‘parent-child relation,
a matter of kinship, illustrated how one could, as a matter of knowledge, conceive
relations between entities’ (2005: 66).
Strathern’s general interest here, like her originally expressed intrigue, concerns
the interplay between science’s relation, encompassing relations such as knowing,
conceiving, and thinking, and anthropology’s relation, such as kinship in general
but also fathering, mothering, generating, and reproducing more particularly. It
expresses her long-standing and continuing fascination with the relationship
between concrete, lived realities and otherwise taken-for-granted abstractions
that structure our theoretical reﬂections, manifest most recently in Strathern’s
insightful reﬂections on the scientiﬁc revolution and the Scottish enlightenment
(e.g. Strathern, 2014a, 2014b). Part of Strathern’s fascination with these particular
connections lies in the priority of talk of relations as epistemic over talk of relations
as interpersonal, the priority of science’s relation over anthropology’s relation.
Strathern takes it as a signiﬁcant linguistic fact that the term ‘relation’ was used
to refer to interpersonal relations only after it had been used already to refer to
epistemic relations. She consequently views the interplay here as more than mere
word play, taking Locke to be at least a weathervane ﬁgure in a transition whereby
the epistemic (‘science’s relation’) became the interpersonal (‘anthropology’s rela-
tion’). Thus, the question that Strathern poses is this: ‘what made the English at
this time endow the words ‘‘relation’’ and ‘‘relative’’ with the property of kinship,
kinship by blood and marriage’ (2005: 51)?
As Strathern notes, this transposition thesis both raises further questions of
intellectual history, relating theory to practice focused on the 17th-century, and
reinforces the post-biological, post-Schneiderian trajectory in the rethinking of
kinship in the new kinship studies. Strathern’s concluding words to the chapter –
‘To what kinship practices did the new concept of relation speak; what emergent
problems or possibilities in social interaction might its properties have addressed?
From the perspective of kinship, anthropologically speaking, the sciences of the
time come to look rather interesting.’ (2005: 77) – have articulated a focused line of
inquiry that Strathern herself has continued to follow in her ongoing work on
relations, where she draws on the work of the historian Naomi Tadmor (2001)
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on family and kinship (Strathern, 2014a: 9–11) and probes the broader milieu of
concepts and practices amidst which she takes the transposition of ‘relation’ to
have been made.
One can distinguish between a general repeated echo between knowledge and
kinship practices and a more speciﬁc claim that Strathern asserts about the histor-
ical trajectory of that echo, namely, that there has been a transposition of ‘the
relation’ from the epistemic to the interpersonal domain. It is this latter claim to
which Strathern’s brief attention to Locke is especially relevant, for she sees
Locke’s reliance on kinship relations as indicative of the putative shift in use of
the term ‘relation’ and the corresponding ways in which relations were conceptua-
lized. According to Strathern, Locke makes use of something new in the air – the
transposition of ‘the relation’ from knowledge to kinship. This is why Locke, des-
pite being mentioned only in passing, nonetheless occupies a central place in
Strathern’s more wide-ranging discussion. Recognition of this transposition
thesis should function to remove any lingering complacency in simply assuming
kinship as a basic or primitive domain for discussions of relations, natural
relations.
Our sketch in Sections II–III of Locke’s views and the context in which he
articulated them, however, provides reason to call into question Strathern’s
views here. Recall that the problem that Locke is grappling with in II.xxv of the
Essay – the problem of the nature of relations and our conception of them – is an
old one for science’s relation. As we noted, it had been the subject of much dis-
cussion amongst medieval philosophers, who, in turn, anchored their discussion in
Aristotle’s works, especially his Categories and his later Metaphysics (Barnes,
1984). Contrary to Strathern’s transposition thesis, in the medieval literature pre-
ceding Locke the kind of illustrative appeal that Locke himself makes is quite
common.
For example, Thomas Aquinas’s 13th-century Summa Theologica introduces the
distinction between ‘relations according to speech’ and ‘relations according to
nature’; Aquinas illustrates the distinction with the example of father and son.
Some relative terms – such as ‘master’ and ‘slave’, ‘father’ and ‘son’ – are intro-
duced to signify relative dispositions themselves and express ‘relations according to
nature’. Fatherhood, and the relation between father and son, were commonly used
illustratively in these discussions of relations, including in the theological discus-
sions of the Doctrine of the Trinity, focused as they were on making sense of the
relations of father, son, and holy spirit in one person. This is one reason why Locke
could so conﬁdently rely on kinship as an exemplary realm in discussing our know-
ledge of relations in general. Far from being a novel use of ‘relation’, Locke’s
reference to biological kinship in the context of discussing natural relations
forms part of a long-established philosophical tradition.8
Perhaps, thinking about this from another direction, that tradition extends as
far as Aristotle himself, whose term for nonerotic relations of love – philia – is
usually translated as friendship and applies to kin and nonkin alike (Beer and
Gardner, 2015); conjoining that term to ‘sophia’ (wisdom) is what gives us the
14 Anthropological Theory 0(0)
 by guest on August 16, 2016ant.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
term ‘philosophy’, after all, to provide one example of a diﬀerent kind of repeated
echo. In any case, if there is a transposition of ‘the relation’ from the epistemic to
the interpersonal domain, then it has to be located signiﬁcantly earlier than the late
17th-century in which Locke wrote.
Thus, the discussion of relations that Strathern points us to in Locke turns out
to be a misplaced hook on which to hang the transposition thesis, and the tantaliz-
ing questions about why and how, premised as they are on that thesis, are at best
counterfactual wonderings. Precisely how acknowledgement of this point aﬀects
Strathern’s own broader and continuing metarelational discussions – of knowledge
and kinship, of theoretical abstractions and their relation, of relations – I leave as
an issue for future discussion. Since the concession itself invites further questions
about such repeated echoes, I next consider anthropology’s relation and the struc-
turing of the conception of anthropological knowledge through the relationship
between kinship and cultural relativism.
VIII Kinship, ethnocentrism, and relativism
I have just argued that the transposition thesis is undermined by the longer history
of the philosophical entwinement of science’s relation (knowledge) and anthropol-
ogy’s relation (kinship). Yet there remains a deep-seated scepticism within cultural
anthropology that that thesis expresses, one about the kind of objective grounding
for kinship that not only Locke but many past kinship theorists have sought or
presumed (cf. also Sahlins, 2013a, 2013b; Beer and Gardner, 2015). In discussing
what he considered the natural relation of kinship, Locke himself showed a brazen
complacency, as much about cultural variation as about generalizations across
human and non-human species, in saying that ‘‘tis certain, that in reality, the
Relation is the same, betwixt the Begetter, and the Begotten, in the several
Races of other Animals, as well as Men’ (II.xxviii.2, 1975: 349). Does such com-
placency (or perhaps naivety) about human and cultural variation – something that
is one of philosophy’s disciplinary blindspots – vitiate the idea of kinship relations
as exemplars of natural relations, or the very idea of such natural relations forming
part of anthropological knowledge?
The centre of gravity in anthropological work on kinship since the early 1970s
has moved from its long-standing preoccupation with whether kinship is some kind
of universal key to understanding culture to its revival as the new kinship studies
with a focus on distinctively 21st-century concerns such as biotechnology,
reproduction, chosen families, and identity politics. This transition was brokered
via the claim that the study of kinship was little more than an ethnocentric
projection from the West to the Rest, most notably in the ‘critique of kinship’
by David Schneider (1965, 1968, 1972, 1984; cf. also Needham, 1971).
Schneider’s critique and the new kinship studies that followed in its wake called
into question not only the objectivity of kinship studies but redirected the core of
the study of kinship from its ethnographic, cross-cultural home to a locus in
domestic spaces permeated by reproductive technologies.9
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Disciplinary sensitivity within anthropology to the permanent possibility of
ethnocentric bias can be found throughout the history of kinship studies.
Initially, this was a response to the ethnocentric views that launched anthropology:
some cultures, the primitive, were qualitatively impoverished versions of, and his-
torical or evolutionary precedents to, other cultures, the civilized. Along with this
divide between primitive cultures and civilization came parallel divides between
sorts of individuals – primitives and moderns – and between the sorts of minds
they each had: pre-logical, pre-scientiﬁc, savage minds, on the one hand, and the
logical, scientiﬁc, domesticated minds that we moderns have, on the other (Goody,
1977; Adams 1998: ch. 3; Kuper, 1988, 2005).
The relativist view, originating in and best known through the work of Franz
Boas, and inﬂuencing those he trained – most notably Alfred Kroeber, Robert
Lowie, Edward Sapir, Ruth Benedict, and Margaret Mead – holds that each society
has a particular set of social forms and cultural constructs, and that each needs to
be understood on its own terms. The primary task of cultural anthropologists is to
understand and document this cultural variation, analyze how particular cultures
cohere, and (at least for some) illuminatingly draw comparisons and contrasts
between particular cultures. The point of such ethnographic work is not to con-
struct an evolutionary or historical path that led from Them to Us. Rather, if there
is an end beyond that of the intrinsic value of knowledge-generating activity, it is to
provide for a deeper appreciation of human diversity itself, and within that diver-
sity, the forms taken by social and cultural life that depart, sometimes radically,
from our own.10
In the postwar era, more radical forms of cultural relativism emerged in anthro-
pology, some challenging universalistic discourses, such as those centered around
human rights, others developing along with a more explicitly hermeneutic under-
standing of the anthropological endeavor and a particular view of what culture
was. On these latter views, culture is a set of symbols, and the primary task of
anthropology is to understand culture as a symbolic system. This understanding is
interpretative, rather than explanatory, and it requires grasping the meanings of the
symbols constituting a particular culture or some aspect of that culture.
Comparison across cultures, on this view, is a more risky venture, since a particular
system of symbols or cultural constructs might only have the speciﬁc meaning
it does within the corresponding culture, or only for members of that culture.
The commonly-recognized and necessary risk of misplaced generalization from
particular cases, a risk that forms part of every scientiﬁc study, becomes the omni-
present danger of ethnocentric projection, the danger of casting what is merely
one’s own set of cultural symbols with their own culture-bound meanings onto
other cultures.11
Schneider’s critique of kinship was developed very much as part of this under-
standing of culture as a symbolic system, and both that critique and constructive
work in kinship studies fashioned post-Schneider have viewed putatively biological
views of kinship as symptomatic of the lingering ethnocentrism of kinship past. It is
here, I think, that a return to the metaphysics of relations, particularly an appeal to
16 Anthropological Theory 0(0)
 by guest on August 16, 2016ant.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
non-reductive forms of explanationism about relations, mandates rethinking this
view of kinship.
IX A non-reductive view of relations and the integration
of culture and nature
At the end of Section VI I identiﬁed non-reductive forms of explanationism as
articulating the metaphysical view of relations best suited to both Sahlins’ and
Strathern’s appropriations of Locke. Such views of relations are content to provide
an account of any particular relation in terms that include other relations, rather
than simply intrinsic properties (or modes). For non-reductive explanationists, the
way to take relations seriously is not to assimilate them, in one way or another, to
intrinsic properties, as do reductive forms of explanationism, but to consider them
on their own terms. So what does this suggest for the broader understanding of
cultural orders that Sahlins takes historical ethnography to provide, and for the
metarelational explorations of anthropological knowledge that are at the heart of
Strathern’s probing of that repeated echo?
To many in the humanities and social sciences to consider relations on their own
terms reinforces the idea, traceable to Dilthey’s distinction between the Natural and
Geisteswissenschaften, that cultural orders are a completely diﬀerent kind of beast
than natural objects, requiring a distinct form of explanation. One can ﬁll out this
idea in a variety of ways, from the classic appeals to Verstehen associated with Max
Weber through to the maneuvers of contemporary pragmatism, hermeneutics, and
postmodernism. The common idea is that relational knowledge, including know-
ledge produced by historical ethnography and that embedded in the study of kin-
ship, is special, and cannot be readily assimilated to the kinds of knowledge found
in the natural sciences.
I want to ﬂoat another alternative, one that provides the potential for an integrated
rather than a segregated treatment of culture and nature, where such integration does
not require any kind of reduction. With cultural orders, as elsewhere in nature, we
need to take seriously the relational nature of some kinds of objects of inquiry.
Relational knowledge, including historical knowledge, is needed in ethnography
not simply to shed light on descriptions of and disputes about contemporary cultural
orders. It is needed also because there are aspects of those cultural orders that are
themselves historically determined objects, properties, actions, and events. What they
are, most fundamentally, is individuated by the historical trajectory that they form a
part of, the historical chain running from past to present that has produced them.
Likewise, the genealogical relations that at last partially and sometimes constitute
kinship relations represent a kind of historical chain linking ancestors to descendants,
even when genealogy is only loosely or remotely connected to a reproductive path-
way. Historical chains, in turn, are causal chains, and non-reductive explanationism
makes possible a view of relations themselves as causally eﬃcacious, as components in
causal mechanisms. They are explanatorily legitimate sources in systematic attempts
to ‘carve nature’ – including culture – ‘at its joints’.
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In short, rather than taking non-reductive explanationism as grounds for a kind
of intellectual apartheid between the natural and social sciences that shores up
cultural relativism, consider it as oﬀering the basis for a reinvigorated, expanded
conception of anthropological knowledge and objectivity, whether we are consider-
ing Sahlins on cultural orders or Strathern on kinship. This presupposes a minimal
form of realism about relations, including social relations, perhaps departing from
Locke’s own productively confused work on qualities and relations. As with
Locke’s primary qualities, there is a distinction between relations as they are
(though not so much in as between objects), and the ideas that we have of those
relations. Such a view requires an endorsement of something like the distinction
that Locke drew between natural relations (such as kinship) and other relations
that are merely a product of our mental or intentional interactions with the world.
X Pluralism about relations and the objectivity of kinship
knowledge
On the view that I have defended, appeals to relations, including Locke’s natural
relations, play a genuinely explanatory role in anthropological knowledge, and this
requires some kind of non-subjectivist view of the metaphysics of relations. Yet
such appeals need not remain unanalyzed, as the face value view holds; nor should
they be eliminated in favor of non-relational properties – intrinsic properties or
Locke’s modes – as reductive versions of explanationism maintain. Making sense
of relations and their role in anthropological knowledge requires a non-reductive
version of explanationism, according to which relations can be understood and
analyzed in terms of one another, whether such an understanding is historical (as it
is for Sahlins) or more generally metarelational (as it is for Strathern).
As indicated by their attraction both to subjectivism and to reductive versions of
explanationism, philosophers have never been all that comfortable with what we
might think of as a metaphysics with relations all the way down. But this is at least
partly a function of their having seldom focused their gaze on the metaphysical
demands of the social sciences, where the diﬃculties facing eliminativist or reduc-
tive views of relations loom largest. The study of kinship itself does not just focus
on anthropology’s relation but is replete with appeals to relations and relational
properties: mother and daughter, ancestor and descendant, and spouse and pro-
genitor are just a sample of the relational kinds that constitute the study of kinship.
Furthermore, the appeal to relations between individuals is ubiquitous in making
sense of how kinship operates in any particular context. Shares a house or history
with, works or eats together with, feels an aﬃnity or identiﬁes with, are all sym-
metrical relations constitutive of kinship that stand together with the brute appeals
to sexual relations at the heart of kinship as a matter of aﬃnity and consanguinity.
Non-reductive explanationism best allows us to make sense of the place of such
non-biological relations in kinship. It does so without requiring the rejection of a
role for biological, genealogical, or reproductive relations in our knowledge of
what kinship is, and what it means for practices centered on kinship.
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So the metaphysical take-home message regarding kinship is pluralistic, perhaps
more so than Sahlins’ (2013a) encompassing characterization of kinship simply as
mutuality of being – as curiously reductive and incomplete as it is pithy – which
Sahlins defends as a robustly non- or even anti-biological view of kinship (though
see Sahlins, 2013b).12 The pluralism I have in mind embraces a wide variety of
relations, including biological relations, as constitutive of kinship. And here we
may return to Locke, one ﬁnal time. As we have seen, Locke thinks that ‘Mankind
have ﬁtted their Notions and Words to the use of common Life, and not to the
truth and extent of Things’ (1975: 349). Explanationism is the view of relations best
suited to recognizing the gap between our ‘Notions and Words’ and ‘the truth and
extent of Things’, and the ‘common Life’ that Locke appeals to here in fact under-
writes non-reductive forms of explanationism. With respect to kinship, that
common life is one shared by human beings across cultures, despite possessing a
diversity that Locke himself was not sensitive to. Biological relations are not a
foundation for social or cultural relations, nor should they be jettisoned in favor
of them. They are simply part of the rich plurality of relations that constitute
kinship, and play more or less a role, depending on the context, in explaining
and understanding it.13
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Notes
1. See Locke (1975 [1690]). I will rely on this edition of the Essay, using the standard way of
referring to book, chapter, and section, e.g. (II.viii.10).
2. Strathern’s work (e.g. Strathern, 1992, 2005) has contributed much to this revival of the
study of kinship divorced from what I have elsewhere (Wilson, in press a) called bio-
essentialism. For a sampling of the new kinship studies, see Bamford and Leach (2009),
Carsten (2000, 2004), Eng 2010, Faubion (1996, 2001), Franklin (2013, 2014), Franklin
and McKinnon (2001), Levine (2008), Peletz (1995, 2001), Parkin and Stone (2004),
Toren (2015), Weston (1997) and Yanagisako and Collier (1987).
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3. Perhaps more in need of resolution is the apparent dissonance between Sahlins’ general
defence of the objectivity of ethnographic knowledge and his recently expressed views of
kinship in particular (e.g. Sahlins, 2013a), which calls in to question much of what has at
least passed for such knowledge in the study of kinship. I leave this issue for another
occasion.
4. Although each of these labels can be used to pick out more specific, distinguishable
views, for our purposes here I will use ‘subjectivist’ as the generic for such views and
ignore the differences that might be drawn between such views.
5. The most sophisticated defence of this sort of subjectivist view of Locke on relations,
‘foundational conceptualism’, is Ott (in press); the view itself is defended by Heil (2012).
6. Corpuscularianism holds that the material world is made up of atom-like particles,
corpuscles, possessing primarily qualities, and that these ultimately explain the observ-
able, material world. See Alexander (1985) for Locke’s corpuscularianism, and
Jacovides (2007) and Wilson (2002, 2016) for discussion of Locke on primary qualities.
7. Just which relations are of focus varies across anthropological traditions. An explicit
concern with social relations runs through British social anthropology; see especially
Evans-Pritchard (1937, 1940, 1951) and Radcliffe-Brown (1957). Levi-Strauss (1963,
1966) is the anthropologist best-known for emphasizing the importance of relations in
human thought, and for offering the Lockean-sounding diagnosis of a major disciplin-
ary error in anthropology’s focusing on the study of things rather than the relations
between them. Again, diversions for another occasion.
8. For Aquinas’s views, see Summa Theologica I, q. 13, a. 7, ad 1., as quoted by Jeffrey
Bower, ‘Medieval Theories of Relations’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/relations-medieval/). I have relied on Bower’s excellent –
discussion here more generally.
9. On the new kinship studies, see the works referred to in Note 2. While the trend
described here is persistent, it is not all-pervasive in the study of kinship. For relatively
recent work on kinship that shows more affinity with older ethnographic kinship studies
see Allen et al. (2008), Berman (2014), Chapais (2008), Dziebel (2007), Godelier (2004),
Godelier et al. (1998), Mattison et al. (2014) and McConvell et al. (2013).
10. Relativism has distinct disciplinary histories anthropology and philosophy; Lukes (2008)
and Brown (2008) convey a good sense of the contrast. For discussions of moral
relativism that engage especially with anthropology, see Gellner (1985), Hollis and
Lukes (1982) Horton (1993), Jarvie (1984) and Wong (1984, 2006). For more elaborate
discussions of relativism and the history and future of anthropology, see Harris (2001:
chs 9–13), Hatch (1983) and Spiro (1992).
11. On cultural relativism and human rights see Goodale (2006) and Renteln (1988); on
culture as symbolic, see the classic overview provided by Ortner (1984).
12. For further discussion of Sahlins (2013a), see the 10-author 2013 book symposium in
Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 3(2): 245–316, together with Sahlins’ entertaining
and informative replies published in the subsequent issue of the journal (Sahlins, 2013b).
13. For a sketch of a view of kinship that fits with non-reductive explanationism, see the
discussion of the homeostatic property cluster view of kinship in Wilson (in press a).
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